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FIGHTING MUNICIPAL "TAG-TEAM": THE
FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS
ACT AND ITS USE IN OBTAINING ACCESS
TO HOUSING FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES
Robert L. Schonfeld t and Seth P. Stein .
Introduction
Following urban unrest in the 1960s, Congress enacted the Fair
Housing Act as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to pro-
hibit housing discrimination against individuals based upon race,
color, religion, or national origin.1 Recognizing a similar need to
combat housing discrimination against persons with disabilities,
Congress amended the Fair Housing Act in 1988 to enjoin housing
discrimination against such persons.2 In amending the Fair Hous-
ing Act, Congress mandated that persons with disabilities "be con-
sidered as individuals"' 3 and prohibited the use of local laws and
ordinances that made housing unavailable to persons with disabili-
ties because of their disabilities.4
While the reasons posited by municipalities and homeowners to
justify discrimination on the basis of handicap have been similar to
those expressed by parties attempting to justify discrimination on
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1. H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2176 [hereinafter House Report].
2. Id. at 2179.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2185.
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the basis of race,5 the issues that have arisen in litigation under the
Fair Housing Amendments Act ("the Amendments" or "the
FHAA") have differed from those presented in earlier Fair Hous-
ing Act cases. Whether an individual is eligible for protection
under the definition of "handicap" and whether a particular resi-
dence is covered under the FHAA have been litigated on several
occasions,6 while it is unlikely that a person's race, religion, color,
or national origin would be a contested issue.
Similarly, the zoning issues arising under the FHAA are differ-
ent from those presented prior to the Amendments. Earlier, zon-
ing litigation usually challenged local ordinances prohibiting the
construction of multiple-family dwellings, on the ground that such
ordinances had the impact of perpetuating racial discrimination.7
Under the FHAA, the zoning issues in litigation generally pertain
to the denial of special-use permits, the validity of "facially-neu-
tral" zoning classifications that do not specifically apply to persons
with handicaps but have a discriminatory impact on those persons,
and laws and ordinances that single out persons with handicaps for
special treatment.
The Amendments contain a new "reasonable accommodation"
provision, which requires municipalities to make a reasonable ac-
commodation to permit persons with handicaps to reside in the
dwelling of their choice.8 However, the Amendments exclude from
coverage certain local laws and ordinances that may preclude per-
sons with disabilities from obtaining housing;9 those laws have
been the subject of considerable litigation. Moreover, because so
many of the issues pertaining to handicap discrimination involve
5. For example, compare Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (town sought to bar housing for
minorities on grounds that housing would violate zoning laws and create traffic and
parking problems) with Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179,
1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (town alleged zoning laws precluded housing for former al-
coholics and substance abusers); United States v. City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 442, 447
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (city opposed residence for persons with handicaps because resi-
dence would violate zoning law and create parking problems), rev'd sub nom. Smith
& Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, - F.3d - (6th Cir. 1993).
6. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Metro Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (village could not establish zoning policies that foreclosed con-
struction of low-income housing within village), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (challenge to zoning
ordinance prohibiting construction of any new multiple family dwellings as being ra-
cially discriminatory), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Supp. 1993).
9. Id. § 3607(b)(1).
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zoning classifications, special-use permits, and the potential for liti-
gation in local zoning courts, issues of federal-court abstention and
the Federal Anti-Injunction Act have been thoroughly litigated in
handicap housing discrimination cases.
This Article examines the impact of the FHAA on prohibiting
housing discrimination against persons on the basis of their disabil-
ities, and analyzes the court decisions interpreting the FHAA on
questions of land use to determine whether they are consistent
with the stated intentions of the drafters of the Amendments. Part
I traces the legislative intent behind the FHAA and, specifically,
the sections of the Amendments enjoining housing discrimination
against persons with handicaps. Part I also analyzes the court deci-
sions interpreting the Amendments' requirements as to what facts
must be demonstrated to prove discrimination. This Part of the
Article considers judicial treatment of the question of whether cer-
tain handicapped persons meet the statute's definition of "handi-
cap" and whether certain residences qualify for coverage under the
Amendments.
Thereafter, this Article examines the land use issues that recur
frequently in handicap housing discrimination cases. Part II dis-
cusses decisions in which courts have found that actions of munici-
palities constituted intentional discrimination against persons with
handicaps. Part III analyzes court interpretations of both "facially-
neutral" laws and ordinances, and laws and ordinances that pro-
vide for special treatment of persons with handicaps, to determine
if those interpretations comport with the intentions of the drafters
of the Amendments. Part IV considers the impact of the reason-
able accommodation portion of the Amendments on handicap
housing discrimination and the section of the Amendments ex-
empting certain "reasonable" local laws and ordinances from cov-
erage. Part V discusses the doctrine of federal abstention and the
Anti-Injunction Act and their application to the goals of the Fair
Housing Act Amendments. Finally, Part VI recommends an ap-
proach to cases under the FHAA that would be consistent with the
intentions of its drafters.
I. The Fair Housing Amendments Act
In recognition of the existence of housing discrimination against
individuals on the basis of their disabilities,'0 Congress enacted the
FHAA to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of handi-
10. House Report, supra note 1, at 2179.
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cap." The FHAA defines "handicap" 12 and "discrimination" for
the purpose of the statute. 13 In addition, the statute provides for
both administrative procedures and judicial remedies that may be
used to fight housing discrimination against persons with
handicaps. 4
This Part first examines the report of the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives ("the House Report"), which states
the goals of the FHAA. Next, it analyzes the statutory definitions
of "handicap" and "discrimination," along with the remedies to
combat discrimination. Finally, it examines the facts that must be
demonstrated to prove a claim under the FHAA.
A. Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives
The House Report clearly delineates two major goals of the
FHAA. 5 These goals can be summarized as requiring that persons
with disabilities (1) be treated "as individuals" and (2) have equal
access to housing enabling them to reside in a dwelling of their
choice. 16 With regard to the first goal, the House Report unequiv-
ocally states that "[tihe Fair Housing Amendments Act... repudi-
ates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that
persons with handicaps be considered as individuals.' 7
In addition, the House Report expounds that the second goal
shall be a "national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion
of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream."'18 To
that end, the FHAA bars the use of state and local land-use and
health and safety laws, regulations, or practices that discriminate
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3631 (Supp. 1993). Several articles have been written dis-
cussing the FHAA. They include: Michael P. Seng, Disabilities Against Families and
Handicapped Persons Under the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 541 (1989); Bonnie Milstein et al., Fair Housing Amendments of
1988, What It Means For Persons With Mental Disabilities, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
128 (June 1989); C. Ulrich, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 - New Litiga-
tion Tools for Housing Advocates, 46 Bus. LAW. 333 (Nov. 1990); M.J. Kotkin, The
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 - New Strategies for New Procedures, 17
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 755 (1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Supp. 1993).
13. Id. § 3604(f)(1)-(3).
14. Id. §§ 3610, 3612, 3613.
15. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
16. Id. The Amendments also prohibit discrimination based on "familial status"
or, as defined by the Amendments, discrimination against families with children
under the age of 18. See id. at 2180-82; 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e) (Supp. 1993).
17. House Report, supra note 1, at 2179.
18. Id.
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against individuals with disabilities. 19 For example, the FHAA
prohibits housing requirements placed upon groups of unrelated
persons with disabilities that are not imposed upon families or
other groups of unrelated persons of a similar size, because they
discriminate against persons with handicaps.20 According to the
House Report, the Amendments were intended to prohibit the im-
position of special requirements through land-use regulations and
conditional or special-use permits that have the effect of limiting
the ability of persons with disabilities to reside in the residence of
their choice.2' Moreover, the FHAA prohibits the enforcement of
otherwise neutral rules and regulations that result from false or
over-protective assumptions or unfounded fears about persons
with disabilities. 22
Finally, the House Report notes that it is illegal to refuse to
make a reasonable accommodation to permit persons with handi-
caps to reside in dwellings of their choice. 3 It states that changes
must be made in traditional rules to permit a person with a handi-
cap to reside in a dwelling of choice.24 While the House Report
notes that the FHAA does not prohibit local and state restrictions
on the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a resi-
dence, it also recognizes that those restrictions cannot operate to
discriminate on the basis of handicap and must be applicable to all
persons, related and unrelated.25
As a whole, the House Report strongly expresses a policy requir-
ing the treatment of persons with handicaps as individuals and
prohibiting legal barriers that would inhibit persons with disabili-
ties from residing in dwellings of their choice.26 It contemplates
that, barring proof that housing for persons with handicaps will
have a substantial detrimental impact on a neighborhood or that a
government imposed hindrance is necessary for safety, persons
19. Id. at 2185.
20. Id. Prior to the Amendments, many of these requirements would likely have
been barred under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Supreme Court
held that an ordinance which treated a residence for persons with mental retardation
differently from residences for other groups of unrelated persons and apartment
buildings was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because the munici-
pality failed to demonstrate that the ordinance had a rational basis.
21. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2186.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2192.
26. Id. at 2179-86.
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with disabilities should have the same right to live in the residence
and neighborhood of their choice as any non-handicapped per-
son.27 Accordingly, in the absence of either of the above condi-
tions, the FHAA should be construed liberally in favor of housing
for persons with handicaps.
B. Definitions and Procedures of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act
The FHAA extends coverage of the Fair Housing Act topersons
with a "handicap."'2 8 The Amendments define "handicap" as
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment.29
The Amendments specifically exclude persons who are currently
addicted to or engaging in the illegal use of a controlled sub-
stance,30 persons who have been convicted of the illegal manufac-
ture or distribution of a controlled substance,31 and persons whose
occupancy of premises would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result
in substantial physical damage to the property of others.3
27. Id. at 2185.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(h), 3604(f)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1993).
29. Id. § 3602(h).
30. Id. The Amendments utilize the definition of "controlled substance" found in
21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1981), which refers to substances listed in 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1981).
The term "controlled substance" does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt bever-
ages, or tobacco as those terms are defined in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C.
§ 802(6) (1981).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4) (Supp. 1993).
32. Id. § 3604(f)(9). While the language of the statute appears to treat persons
who are a "direct threat" to others as an exclusion, the legislative history seems to
indicate the contrary. See House Report, supra note 1, at 2187-88. The Congressional
report stated that the "direct threat" language in the FHAA was not intended to be
an exclusion but was added "to allay the fears of those who believe that the non-
discrimination provisions of this Act could force landlords and owners to rent or sell
to individuals whose tenancies could pose such a risk." The Congressional report
added that any "direct threat" would have to be established on the basis of a history
of overt acts or current conduct. Id. The report, however, also noted that a landlord
could not ask questions on this topic of potential tenants different from those asked
other potential tenants; see Roe v. Sugar Mill Assocs., 820 F. Supp. 636, 639-40
(D.N.H. 1993) (persons whose occupancy may constitute a threat to other persons
cannot be excluded unless housing provider demonstrates that it cannot make a rea-
sonable accommodation to person with handicap to alleviate threats to other
persons).
FHAA & PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The Amendments' definition of "handicap" is substantially simi-
lar to that contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 197333-a statute
that bars discrimination in federally assisted activities against per-
sons who are handicapped. 34 On its surface, the definition of hand-
icapped appears to be fair. However, the practical application of
this definition in determining which persons and residences are eli-
gible for coverage under the Amendments is troublesome and will
be explored further in Part I.C.35
The Amendments' definition of "discrimination" also appears to
be unequivocal, fair, and in accord with the intentions of the draft-
ers of the Amendments. The FHAA prohibits a person or a mu-
nicipality from (a) making a dwelling unavailable to a person
because of the person's handicap 36 and (b) discriminating in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities connected to such dwelling
because of the person's handicap.37 Moreover, the Amendments
provide a person with a disability with the benefits of the earlier
Fair Housing Act provisions that make it unlawful to "coerce, in-
timidate, threaten or interfere with" any person in the exercise of a
right under the Fair Housing Act.38
33. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (Supp. 1993) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1985);
see House Report, supra note 1, at 2182.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985).
35. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1) (Supp. 1993). Besides prohibiting discriminatory zoning
practices, this section has been used to prohibit private actions aimed at making hous-
ing unavailable for persons with handicaps. See United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp.
1555, 1561-62 (D. Kan. 1992) (attempt to enforce restrictive covenant against resi-
dence for persons with handicaps and threatening and filing lawsuit against residence
violates FHAA); Martin v. Constance, No. 4:90CV00833 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 1994)
(unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal (same); Rhodes v.
Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1991) (same). But see Michigan
Protection & Advocacy Servs. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 726-27, 728-42 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (neighbors' purchase of house for sole purpose of blocking community resi-
dence for persons with mental disabilities did not violate the Amendments and Fair
Housing Act could not constitutionally apply to private transactions); Hotel St.
George v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Fair Housing Act
claim could not be brought by provider of housing for homeless persons with handi-
caps against persons lobbying to block housing for such persons). The decisions in
Scott and Rhodes comport with the intentions of the drafters of the Amendments to
bar private attempts to interfere with the rights of persons with handicaps to housing.
See House Report, supra note 1, at 2184.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (Supp. 1993). The Amendments also require that multi-
family dwellings constructed for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 be designed and
constructed to accommodate persons with handicaps. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(C).
38. Id. § 3617.
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Finally, the FHAA makes it unlawful for a person or a munici-
pality to refuse to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, poli-
cies, practices, or services when such accommodation is necessary
to afford a person the opportunity to reside in a dwelling.3 9 How-
ever, the FHAA exempts from coverage "reasonable local, State or
Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants
permitted to occupy a dwelling."40 The determination of what con-
stitutes a reasonable accommodation has been the subject of con-
siderable litigation and will be discussed further in Part IV."
Under the FHAA, an aggrieved person may commence an ac-
tion in either federal or state court within two years of the alleged
discriminatory housing practice.4 2 A complaint may also be filed
within one year with the Secretary of the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development 43 ("HUD"), and HUD
has the right to file a complaint on its own initiative.44
If a complaint is filed with HUD's Secretary, HUD must initiate
an investigation and attempt to mediate the complaint. 5 If HUD
believes that reasonable cause exists to find that a discriminatory
housing practice has occurred,46 or is about to occur through
threats from the discriminating party, HUD can issue a "charge"
against the party who has engaged in the discriminatory housing
practice.47 After HUD issues a charge it must hold an administra-
tive hearing48 unless the complainant elects to have the charge
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Supp. 1993). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also
requires that a "reasonable accommodation" be made for persons with handicaps.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). The Amendments also provide
that discrimination also includes a refusal on the part of a party to permit a person
with a handicap to make a modification in premises, at the handicapped persons' ex-
pense, to afford the person with the handicap full enjoyment of the premises. 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 1993).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Supp. 1993).
41. See infra notes 208-45 and accompanying text.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1993). An aggrieved party may file a com-
plaint in court simultaneously with filing a complaint with HUD. Id. § 3613(a)(2).
However, if a complaint is in the process of being heard by a HUD administrative law
judge, a complaint cannot be filed in court. Id. § 3613(a)(3).
43. Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 3610(a)(1)(B), 3610(b).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(g)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. 1993). If a charge is filed, an aggrieved
person may elect to have the claims asserted in the charge decided in a civil action
filed in court by the United States Attorney General. Id. §§ 3612(a), (o)(1).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1977) (threats, coercion, intimidation and interference
constitute violations of the Fair Housing Act)
48. Id. § 3612(g).
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heard in federal court.49 If, after an administrative hearing, a mu-
nicipality is found to have committed a discriminatory act, injunc-
tive and monetary relief as well as civil penalties may be issued
against the municipality.50
If an aggrieved person files a complaint with HUD charging ille-
gality with regard to any state or local zoning or other land-use law
or ordinance, HUD's Secretary must refer the matter to the United
States Attorney General ("the Attorney General"). 1 HUD's Sec-
retary may also refer a matter to the Attorney General where
prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Fair Housing Act.5 2 Moreover, the Attorney General may inter-
vene in lawsuits filed by private parties. 3
In court actions, courts may issue injunctive relief and actual and
punitive damages against a municipality found to have committed a
discriminatory act.54
C. Establishing a Fair Housing Amendments Act Case
Establishing a handicap discrimination case under the FHAA is
substantially the same as establishing a race discrimination case.
However, in a handicap discrimination case the person alleging dis-
crimination must establish that the person or persons to live in the
residence in question is or are "handicapped" as defined in the
FHAA.5 5 Courts have used three different approaches to deter-
mine whether persons and residences are eligible for coverage
under the Amendments. 6 None of these approaches have been
totally satisfactory.
The most common approach has been to assume that if a resi-
dence is being established to house persons falling within a particu-
49. Id. § 3612(a).
50. Id. § 3612(g)(3). The municipality would have the right to judicial review of
the administrative law judge's decision. Id. § 3612(i). In addition, attorneys' fees are
available to the prevailing party of an administrative hearing. Id. § 3612(p).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C) (Supp. 1993). The Attorney General also has the
right to commence actions in a United States district court where there is reasonable
cause to believe that persons are engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
enjoyment of the rights granted under the Amendments. Id. § 3614(a).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e)(1) (Supp. 1993).
53. Id. § 3614(e).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (Supp. 1993). Attorneys' fees are also recoverable by
the prevailing party under the Amendments. Id. § 3613(c).
55. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,458-
60 (D.N.J. 1992) (prospective residents of group home for recovering drug addicts);
Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 728-30 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (residence for
AIDS sufferers).
56. See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
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lar category-for example, persons with a mental illness-the
residence is automatically covered under the statute. This ap-
proach has been utilized even where the actual individuals to re-
side in the house have not yet been specifically selected. 7 For
example, in Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield,8 the
court found that because a residence was intended to house recov-
ering alcoholics and addicts, the residence was automatically cov-
ered under the FHAA.5 9 Similarly, in Baxter v. City of Belleville,6 °
57. See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 237
(D.N.J. 1992) (residence for persons with mental illness covered under FHAA even
though actual residents had not been chosen).
58. 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
59. Id. at 1342. The Oxford House-Evergreen court cited the House Report, supra
note 1, at 2182, and Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987), for the proposition that recovering alcoholics and addicts
were meant to be included in the definition of "persons with handicaps." In Sullivan,
the court found that recovering alcoholics and addicts were "persons with handicaps"
under the similar definition of "handicap" utilized in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The Oxford House-Evergreen court, however, failed to recognize that neither the
House Report nor the Sullivan court stated that all recovering alcoholics and addicts
fall into the category of "persons with handicaps" but rather that recovering al-
coholics and addicts could be "persons with handicaps." In addition, the Oxford
House-Evergreen court found that the former alcoholics and substance abusers did
not constitute a direct threat to the community and declined to apply the exception to
the Amendments contained at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9). Oxford House-Evergreen, 769
F. Supp. at 1342.
60. 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989). The Baxter court found that even though the
plaintiff was not a person with a handicap, he had standing to sue because the munici-
pality's discriminatory action of denying the plaintiff a use permit caused him to suffer
economic injury-the loss of income from tenants. Courts have found that other or-
ganizations who were not themselves persons with handicaps had standing to com-
mence actions under the FHAA. See Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan
and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1208-09 (D. Conn. 1992) (not-for-profit foun-
dation establishing residence for persons with HIV had standing, as its goals of pro-
viding services to persons with disabilities were thwarted by municipality even though
future tenants had not been chosen by foundation); Horizon House Dev. Servs., Inc.
v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 692-93 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd,
995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (organization seeking to provide residential services for
persons with mental retardation had standing to challenge zoning ordinance prevent-
ing it from establishing residence); Easter Seal Soc'y, 798 F. Supp. at 237 (organization
providing residential services to persons with mental disabilities had standing to chal-
lenge municipal actions even though actual residents had not been chosen). But see
Hotel St. George v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (provider of
housing for persons with disabilities did not have standing to challenge actions of
community opponents to housing).
The municipality in Baxter claimed that the residence in question was not a "dwell-
ing" covered under the FHAA. 720 F. Supp. at 731; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b)
(Supp. 1993) (defining "dwelling" in the Fair Housing Act). The Baxter court held
that although the length of residence for the proposed residents with HIV-positive
would vary, the persons to live in the residence would not be living there as mere
transients; thus, the residence was covered under the Fair Housing Act. See also
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the court held that because a residence was intended for persons
who were HIV-positive, that residence was per se covered under
the FHAA.6 '
It may well be that the vast majority of recovering alcoholics,
addicts, and persons who are HIV-positive are persons with handi-
caps as defined by the FHAA. 62 However, because the Amend-
ments mandate that persons be treated as individuals,63 simply
belonging to a particular class should not mean that a person's con-
dition automatically comports with the statutory definition of
handicapped.
Equally troublesome is the fact that both Oxford House-Ever-
green and Baxter involved residences for which not all of the resi-
dents had been selected.64 It is difficult to perceive how one can
label persons who have not even been selected as "handicapped."
However, if a municipality's illegal activities are the cause for par-
ticular persons not being selected-both Oxford House-Evergreen
and Baxter involved municipalities that had wrongfully blocked the
United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (summer homes
maintained by country club were deemed to be "dwellings" for the purpose of the Fair
Housing Act).
61. 720 F. Supp. at 729-31. The court cited the House Report, supra note 1, at
2179, for the position that persons with AIDS and HIV-positive were "persons with
handicaps" under the Amendments. See also Support Ministries For Persons With
AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 130-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing
the House Report, a congressional transcript indicating that a proposal to exclude
persons with HIV from the amendments was defeated in the House of Representa-
tives, and case law interpreting a similar definition of "handicap" in the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning
Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1209-10 (D. Conn. 1992) (finding that persons with AIDS
or HIV-positive were "persons with handicaps" under the Amendments); Ass'n of
Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients (A.F.A.P.S.) v. Administracion de Regla-
mentos, 740 F. Supp. 95, 102-103 (D.P.R. 1990). However, the House Report does
not say that all persons with AIDS or who are HIV-positive fall into the category of
"persons with handicaps" but rather that these persons could be "persons with
handicaps."
The courts in Baxter, Support Ministries, and A.F.A.P.S. also concluded that per-
sons with AIDS or who are HIV-positive do not represent a danger to other persons
and that the Amendments' exception under 42 U.S.C. section 3604(f)(9) was inappli-
cable. Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 733; Support Ministries, 808 F. Supp. at 136-37;
A.F.A.P.S., 740 F. Supp. at 103.
62. See infra notes 77 and 79.
63. House Report, supra note 1, at 2179.
64. See Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1329, 1331-32. (municipality had
precluded house from adding three additional persons and "John Does" are named as
plaintiffs); Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 722, 730 (residence proposed for up to seven per-
sons, but proposed operator only knew of three persons who could move into
residence).
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full establishment of the involved residences 65 -then requiring
prior selection of residents as a prerequisite to standing under the
FHAA might result in reduced access to the courts in the case of
illegal municipal activities. This reduction in access to the courts
might lead to a reduction in housing for persons with disabilities,
which would conflict with a major goal of the FHAA-i.e., to as-
sure persons with handicaps equal access to housing. 66
A second approach, used by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Southern Management Corp. ,67 has been labelled by one court as a
"bootstrap argument. '68 In Southern Management, the court con-
cluded that because a group of recovering alcoholics and addicts
had been denied housing on the basis of their status as such, they
were automatically deemed to be "handicapped" and entitled to
coverage under the Amendments. 69 In effect, the Southern Man-
agement court decided the merits of the case before it decided the
threshold issue of standing. This approach is obviously in conflict
with the normal manner in which courts reach decisions.
Both of these approaches were rejected by the court in Oxford
House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill,70 which used a third ap-
proach. In Township of Cherry Hill, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against a municipality seeking to interfere with the
establishment of a residence for former alcoholics and substance
abusers.71 The court found, for the purposes of the preliminary in-
junction motion, that the plaintiffs were persons with "handicaps."
The court based its decision upon expert testimony regarding the
general limitations in major life activities that are faced by recover-
ing alcoholics and addicts and upon the testimony of a current resi-
dent of the home as to the specific limitations which that resident
suffered.72
The court's decision in Township of Cherry Hill appears to re-
quire a more individualized examination of each person when the
case is at the summary judgment or trial stage.73 While this ap-
proach meets the Amendments' aim of treating persons with
65. See Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1343-46; Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at
730-33 (actions of municipality to block residence violated FHAA).
66. House Report, supra note 1, at 2179, 2185.
67. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
68. Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459-60 n.21
(D.N.J. 1992).
69. 955 F.2d at 917-23.
70. 799 F. Supp. 450.
71. Id. at 465.
72. Id. at 458-60.
73. Id. *
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handicaps as individuals, it would be impractical in a case where
the persons to reside in a residence have not been selected because
of a municipality's illegal blockage of the residence. Additionally,
if the individualized approach used by the Township of Cherry Hill
court were utilized, and if it were determined that some of the resi-
dents of a home met the definition of "handicap" while other resi-
dents did not, it would be difficult for a court to determine whether
a particular residence was covered under the Amendments.
It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile the two main goals of the
FHAA in determining which residences are covered under the stat-
ute. On the one hand, treating all individuals within a certain cate-
gory as being "handicapped," and thus covered under the
Amendments, may assure access to housing, but it also results in
persons with disabilities not being treated as individuals. On the
other hand, treating persons with disabilities as individuals may re-
strict access to the FHAA and thus may impede access to housing.
Accordingly, a combination of the approaches may best serve
both the goals of individualization and access. In Township of
Cherry Hill, the court was satisfied at the preliminary injunction
stage with a combination of expert testimony showing that recover-
ing alcoholics, and substance abusers in general, face limitations in
major life activities and testimony from a resident of the house in
issue. The court noted that it would have required more evidence
on a motion for summary judgment or at trial.7 5 However, the evi-
dence proffered in Township of Cherry Hill should be enough to
prevail on a motion for summary judgment or at trial. A combina-
tion of both expert testimony plus individualized testimony from a
resident or a potential resident, where possible, should be sufficient
to satisfy the Amendments' twin goals of individualization and ac-
cess. The evidence must demonstrate that there is a nexus between
the person's disability and the person's need to reside in a special
therapeutic environment.
A person who demonstrates that he or she is handicapped, as
defined under the FHAA, may prevail on a housing discrimination
claim by showing that (1) the person has been intentionally dis-
74. Id. As to whether a residence would be covered if it contained some persons
with handicaps and some non-handicapped persons, it could be argued that non-hand-
icapped persons are necessary to provide support to the persons with handicaps. Cf.
Crossroads Apartments Assocs. v. LeBoo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (City Ct. of Rochester
1991) (reasonable accommodation to person with mental disabilities would have to be
made to permit person to keep a cat in his apartment if he could demonstrate that the
cat was necessary to assist him in coping with his mental illness).
75. 799 F. Supp. at 458-60.
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criminated against because of the person's handicap, (2) a law or
practice has had a disparate impact on the person because of the
person's handicap, or (3) the defendant has refused to make rea-
sonable accommodations in policies or practices so as to accommo-
date the person with a handicap.76
Intentional discrimination generally involves a showing of intent
on the part of the alleged discriminating party." In determining
intent, courts examine the discriminatory impact of the party's ac-
tions, the historical background of the decision in question, the se-
quence of events leading up to the challenged decision, departures
from normal procedural sequences, and departures from normal
substantive criteria.78 Courts particularly examine zoning changes
enacted in reaction to a proposal of housing for persons with
disabilities.79
In the case of a disparate impact claim, several of the federal
circuit courts have created formulas that are substantially similar in
practice although differing somewhat in language.80 A disparate
76. See, e.g., Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n,
790 F. Supp. 1197, 1210-11 (D. Conn. 1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of
Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1343, 1329 (D.N.J. 1991); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F.
Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Ill. 1989).
77. See, e.g., McKinney Foundation, 790 F. Supp. at 1211 (analyzing intent as well
as disparate impact).
78. Id.; see also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding that minutes of municipal meetings constituted evidence demon-
strating discriminatory intent on part of the municipality).
79. See Support Ministries, 808 F. Supp. at 133-34.
80. Compare Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
936 (2d Cir.), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metro. Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Ar-
lington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) with United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
The standards set forth in Town of Huntington are discussed infra at notes 75-79 and
accompanying text. In Arlington Heights, the Seventh Circuit established a four
prong test for evaluating whether municipal conduct had a discriminatory impact.
The prongs include: 1) the strength of the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect;
2) whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent; 3) the municipality's pro-
fessed interest in taking the action complained of; and 4) whether the plaintiff seeks
to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of a protected
class or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners wishing to provide housing. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. In City of
Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit held that a governmental defendant could prevail if it
demonstrated "a compelling governmental interest commensurate with the level of
scrutiny afforded the class of people affected by the law under the equal protection
clause." City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n.4. The Supreme Court, in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985), posited the level
of scrutiny required when the Court held that municipal ordinances would be ex-
amined to determine if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. See Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir.
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impact formula that has been increasingly adopted by district
courts throughout the country is that espoused by the Second Cir-
cuit in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,"' a case
involving discrimination on the basis of race. In Town of Hunting-
ton, the Second Circuit held that a prima facie disparate impact
case is established by showing that the challenged practice "actu-
ally or predictably results in discrimination; in other words that it
has a discriminatory effect."8 2 This means that the conduct of the
alleged discriminatory party is more harshly felt on people with
handicaps than those without. The Town of Huntington court held
that a person covered by the Fair Housing Act need not show that
the practice complained of was made with discriminatory intent, a
although if evidence of such intent were present, that evidence
would weigh "heavily" in proving the case. 84
Once a prima facie disparate impact case has been established,
the court said that the defendant must prove that its actions fur-
thered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate bona fide govern-
mental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest
with less discriminatory effect.85 Under the Town of Huntington
standard, a court may also consider whether the plaintiff is suing to
compel a governmental defendant to build housing or only to re-
quire a governmental defendant to eliminate some obstacle to
housing. 6 A municipality must show more justification for its ac-
tion if the plaintiff is suing to eliminate a barrier to housing.87
As the Second Circuit noted, "clever men may easily conceal
their motivations. '8 8 Because municipal officials do not often ex-
plicitly express their animus to housing for persons with handicaps,
1991) (court used Cleburne standard in holding municipal ordinance to be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose and thus not violative of the FHAA).
81. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), affid, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). Other courts outside of the
Second Circuit that have applied the Town of Huntington test in Fair Housing Act
cases include Harden v. Peach Bottom Township, No. 1:CV-92-1750, slip op. at 6
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1993) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal); Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 461; Oxford House-Evergreen, 769
F. Supp. at 1344; Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients (A.F.A.P.S.)
v. Adminstracion de Reglamentos, 740 F. Supp. 95, 101 (D.P.R. 1990).
82. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 936.
85. Id. at 939. This is similar to the standard used previously by the Third Circuit
in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978).
86. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 935.
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numerous handicap discrimination cases brought under the FHAA
have involved claims that a particular law or practice has a dispa-
rate impact on persons with disabilities. 89 These cases have
presented the most interesting legal questions and, they will be an-
alyzed later in this Article.'
Although the Town of Huntington decision was issued in a race
discrimination case, its principles have equal application to handi-
cap discrimination cases. Indeed, the municipality's reasons for ex-
cluding housing for minorities-inconsistency with zoning laws,
and traffic and parking problems-are identical to some of the rea-
sons given by municipalities for excluding housing for persons with
disabilities. 91 Just as the Second Circuit found such municipality
excuses unjustifiable for excluding housing for minorities, courts
have found similar municipal explanations unjustifiable for exclud-
ing housing for persons with handicaps.92
Finally, a person with handicaps could prevail on a housing dis-
crimination claim by showing that the defendant refused to make
reasonable accommodations in policies or practices so as to give
the plaintiff an opportunity to reside in a residence of choice.93 To
prevail on a "reasonable accommodation claim," a person with a
handicap must demonstrate that (1) a request for an accommoda-
tion was made, (2) such request was either ignored or denied, (3)
the accommodation was necessary to enable the person to use and
enjoy the dwelling of that person's choice, and (4) the accommoda-
tion was reasonable.94
In determining whether to order a municipality to make a rea-
sonable accommodation in its laws, rules, or practices to permit the
establishment of a residence for handicapped persons, courts have
examined whether the residence would impose any administrative
or financial burdens on a municipality,95 whether the residence
would create a fundamental or substantial change in a neighbor-
hood,96 or whether the accommodation would undermine the basic
89. See infra notes 142-229 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 142-229 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 116-53, 187-95, 216-29 and accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Supp. 1993).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1344-45; Township of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 461.
96. Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1344-45; Township of Cherry Hill,
799 F. Supp. at 461; see also Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp.
1179, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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purpose of an ordinance or practice.97 If there is no evidence of
any of the above criteria, a reasonable accommodation must be
made to permit the establishment of housing for persons with
disabilities.98
H. Discriminatory Intent
This Part of the Article will analyze court interpretations of the
Amendments. Specifically, it will examine land-use cases to deter-
mine if they are consistent with the drafters' intentions of treating
persons with disabilities on an individual basis and of permitting
persons with handicaps to reside in the dwellings of their choice.
Cases where municipalities have been found to have demon-
strated discriminatory intent with regard to housing for persons
with disabilities can generally be classified into four categories: (a)
denial of special-use permits; (b) requirements for special-use per-
mits not placed upon non-handicapped persons; (c) prosecution of
residences for persons with disabilities on the grounds that the resi-
dences were in noncompliance with a zoning classification; and (d)
a municipality's passage of local laws and ordinances to prevent the
establishment of a residence for persons with handicaps. In all of
these cases, statements from municipal officials in support of local
opposition to residences, coupled with municipal departures from
usual procedure, have formed the basis for court decisions finding
discriminatory intent on the part of municipalities.
In several instances, courts have ordered municipalities to grant
special-use permits to residences for handicapped persons.99 For
example, in Baxter v. City of Belleville,1° the court enjoined a mu-
nicipality from denying a special-use permit for a residence for per-
sons infected with HIV.1° 1 The court held that the municipality
acted with discriminatory intent in denying the permit based upon
unjustified fears about persons with HIV.1° More specifically, the
97. United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (W.D. Wis.
1992).
98. Id.; see also supra note 112.
99. Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.
Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Easter Seal Soc'y v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F.
Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1992); United States. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F.
Supp. 220 (D.P.R. 1991); Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients
(A.F.A.P.S) v. Adminstracion de Reglamentos, 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990); Baxter
v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. I11. 1989).
100. 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. I11. 1989).
101. Id. at 734-35.
102. Id. at 731-33. For example, one alderman testified that he voted against grant-
ing a special-use permit because of the residence's proximity to a junior high school
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Baxter court noted that in denying a permit the municipal zoning
board expressed fears about property values, the proximity of the
residence to a school, and the potential spread of AIDS without
any supporting documentation or evidence. 10 3
Similarly, in Ass'n of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients
(A.F.A.P.S.) v. Administracion de Reglamentos,1°4 the court en-
joined a municipal agency from refusing to issue a special-use per-
mit for a hospice for persons with AIDS. °5 The court found that
the municipality had intentionally discriminated against the resi-
dence in denying a permit based upon statements made by local
decision-makers in response to local opposition to the residence
and a showing of selective enforcement of regulations against the
hospice. 0 6 The court specifically noted that one municipal deci-
sion maker stated that community opposition to the residence
played a role in his decision to deny the permit and that the munic-
ipality's strict application of regulations was unprecedented. 0 7
Both the Baxter and A.F.A.P.S. decisions clearly comport with
the aims of the FHAA in combatting blatant handicap
discrimination.10 8
In contrast, the persons seeking to establish a residence for per-
sons with HIV in Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town
Plan and Zoning Commission,10 9 refused to apply for a special-use
permit requested by the municipality on the ground that the resi-
dence was purportedly a "charitable institution" or a "chronic and
convalescent nursing home.""i 0 The McKinney Foundation court
enjoined the municipality from requiring a special-use permit for
the residence, holding that the municipality's requirement was
based upon discriminatory intent."' The court found that no per-
and a grade school even though there was no evidence that the residents would be a
danger to the school children. Id. at 723-26.
103. Id. at 731-33.
104. 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990).
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id. at 104-06.
107. Id.
108. See House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
109. 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992).
110. Id. at 1207. Often, municipalities require special-use permits on the grounds
that unrelated persons with handicaps residing together do not comport with the defi-
nition of "family" under the local ordinance or are deemed a health-related facility
under the local ordinance. See, e.g., Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan
and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992) (residence for persons with
AIDS deemed to be health related facility for purpose of local ordinance and not
within local ordinance's definition of "family").
111. Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 1211-16.
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mit was necessary because the residence would house fewer than
the maximum number of unrelated persons permitted to live to-
gether as a legal housekeeping unit; thus, complying with the ordi-
nance's definition of "family. ' 112  The court noted that the
municipality's requirement of a permit resulted from organized
and widespread opposition to the residence within the town,1 3 and
found that the municipality's request for detailed information
about the proposed residents constituted a substantial departure
from normal procedure.1 4
Discriminatory intent has also been found where municipalities
prosecuted residences for persons with handicaps on the grounds
that the residences did not comply with zoning ordinances. A typi-
cal case is United States v. Borough of Audubon,1' 5 In Borough of
Audubon, a municipality attempted to enjoin the operation of a
residence for former alcoholics and substance abusers by relying on
selective enforcement of municipal ordinances. 116 In response to
complaints from local citizens, the municipality's mayor stated that
he shared the sentiments of his constituents and "that there is noth-
ing more that I would like to do than to just come in and just tell
these people you have until noon to get out of town.""' 7 In addi-
tion, another municipal official stated that he wanted to "oversee a
conference of the police community ... so that we tag-team the
individual [owner of the residence] through the respective Borough
officials."" 8
Based upon these statements and the selective enforcement of
the ordinances against the residence, the court found that discrimi-
natory animus was the motivation behind the municipality's at-
tempts to enjoin the residence's operation.119 Accordingly, the
112. Id. at 1213.
113. Id. at 1211-16.
114. Id. at 1213-15.
115. 797 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 361.
117. Id. at 360.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 359-62. The court specifically noted: "Discriminatory intent may be es-
tablished where animus towards a protected group is a significant factor in the com-
munity opposition to which the commissioners are responding .. . on several
occasions, Audubon officials stated that they agreed with or were responding directly
to community opposition which was clearly discriminatory ...." Id. at 361 (citations
omitted). Similarly, in Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1346, the court en-
joined a municipality from attempting to prosecute a zoning violation against a resi-
dence for former alcoholics and substance abusers. Id.. There, the court found that
the municipality had engaged in intentional discrimination, noting comments made by
the mayor in response to neighborhood opposition and the fact that the zoning officer
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court enjoined the municipality from taking any steps to prohibit
the residence's operation.120
Finally, courts have stricken laws and ordinances that were en-
acted to exclude housing for persons with handicaps, on the
grounds that such enactments represented intentional discrimina-
tion.'2 ' For example, in Horizon House Development Services, Inc.
v. Township of Upper Southampton,2 2 the court struck down a lo-
cal law and ordinance that imposed a distance requirement of 1,000
feet for group homes. The court found that the ordinance had
been enacted to exclude a community residence for persons with
mental retardation.12 3
As stated in Part I, the aim of the FHAA was to treat persons
with disabilities as individuals and to permit persons with handi-
caps to reside in the dwellings of their choice. Each of the cases
discussed in Part II comport with those aims.
III. Discriminatory Impact
The "discriminatory impact" test has been applied to both
facially-neutral laws and ordinances, and laws and ordinances that
single out persons with handicaps for specialized treatment. This
Part examines the judicial application of the discriminatory impact
standard to facially-neutral ordinances and to those that single out
persons with handicaps.
A. Facially-Neutral Ordinances
In housing discrimination cases, facially-neutral ordinances have
generally been one of two types. Some zoning classifications de-
fine the term "single family dwelling" in a manner that is not in-
had reversed her view on the legality of the residence after a meeting at which much
neighborhood opposition was expressed. Id. at 1343; accord, Oxford House-C v. City
of St. Louis, No. 91-2402-C(7), slip. op. at 39-42 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 1994) (unpublished
opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
120. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 362.
121. Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.
Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Easter Seal Soc'y v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F.
Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1992).
122. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
123. Id. at 695-97. Similarly, in Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, 808 F.
Supp. at 133-34, the court refused to apply a local ordinance limiting the number of
rooms in a house on the ground that the ordinance had been enacted to exclude a
residence for persons with AIDS. In Easter Seal Soc'y, 798 F. Supp. at 235, the court
refused to enforce an ordinance requiring a residence for persons with mental disabil-
ities to apply for a conditional-use permit on the ground that the ordinance was en-
acted for the purpose of impeding the development of the residence.
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tended to exclude residences for persons with handicaps but has
the effect of excluding such residences. 124 In addition, some ordi-
nances require a group of unrelated persons desiring to live to-
gether to obtain a permit before residing in a community. These
ordinances have the effect of either excluding persons with handi-
caps or hindering their ability to reside in a community.1
2 5
1. Limitations on Single-Family Dwellings
Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon126 is a classic example of
a court's enjoining the enforcement of a "single-family dwelling"
type zoning ordinance. In Town of Babylon, a group of recovering
alcoholics and substance abusers sought to reside in a single-family
residential district. 27 The municipality argued that this group of
persons were unrelated "transients" and were thus prohibited by
the zoning ordinance from residing in any single-family residential
district. 128
The court found that recovering alcoholics and addicts required
a group living arrangement for psychological and emotional sup-
port during the recovery process. 29 The court also found that they
were more likely than persons without handicaps to live with unre-
lated individuals. 3 ° Furthermore, because the recovering al-
coholics could leave at any time due to relapse or recovery, their
length of stay at the residence could not be predicted.' 31 Thus, the
court found that the municipality's zoning ordinance had a greater
impact on persons with disabilities than it did on non-handicapped
persons. 32
After finding the disparate impact on persons with disabilities,
the court considered the municipality's interest in applying its zon-
ing laws and found it to be weak. 33 While a town's interest in zon-
ing requirements is substantial, the court found that the town had
failed to prove that the residence had in any way altered the resi-
124. See, e.g., McKinney Found., 790 F. Supp. at 1217 (discussing standards for eval-
uating "facially neutral" zoning provisions).
125. See infra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
126. 819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
127. 819 F. Supp. at 1179.
128. Id. at 1184.
129. Id. at 1183.
130. Id. This conclusion was reached based on testimony from a founder of Oxford
House. Id. at 1183 n.6.
131. Id. at 1183.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1184.
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dential character of the neighborhood.134 Moreover, town officials
had admitted that the residence was well-maintained and caused
no problems for the community.135 Thus, the Town of Babylon
court concluded that the municipality's purpose for enforcing the
ordinance in this case was weak.
134. Id. at 1183. The court noted that five municipal officials testified that the town
had received no substantial complaints from neighbors in the past year and that the
house was well-maintained. Id. The court also found evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation, noting that the town's supervisor had stated at a town board meeting that the
town had "unfortunately" lost other fights to keep out residences for persons with
handicaps and that another town official stated that he wished that he could go in and
"yank them [the residents] out of their beds .... " Id. at 1184.
135. Id. In Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J.
1992), the court reached a similar conclusion. In Township of Cherry Hill, a munici-
pality attempted to prevent the establishment of a similar home for unrelated recov-
ering alcoholics and substance abusers on the ground that the residence did not have
"permanency and stability." Id. at 454-55, 457. Under a municipal ordinance, groups
of unrelated persons could only reside in residential districts within the municipality if
they could demonstrate "permanency and stability" upon filing an application for a
certificate of occupancy. Id. at 455. The municipality did not have a similar require-
ment for persons related by blood or marriage. Id. at 455, 462. The court enjoined
the municipality from taking any steps to interfere with the establishment of the resi-
dence. Id. at 465. The court found that because recovering alcoholics and substance
abusers were more likely than other persons to require an environment where unre-
lated persons reside together for mutual support during the recovery process, the mu-
nicipality's ordinance had a disproportionate impact on persons with handicaps. Id. at
461. The court then held that the municipality did not have a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for evicting the residents of the home. Id. at 462-63. The court found
that because persons related by blood or marriage did not have to demonstrate per-
manency and stability to reside in a residential area, such requirements should not be
imposed on unrelated persons. Id. at 462. In addition, the court noted that the resi-
dence at issue would enhance the residential character of the neighborhood, and that
there was no record of any complaints from neighbors. Id. Similarly, in Oxford
House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1345 n.21 (D.N.J. 1991), the
court refused to enjoin a residence for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers on
the ground that there was no showing on the record of any police actions brought
against the residence. In enjoining the municipality from taking any actions to pre-
vent the residence, the Oxford House-Evergreen court astutely noted that
"[riecovering alcoholics and drug addicts may never be perceived as 'stable' and 'per-
manent' by communities that object to their presence.... [I]f the exclusionary effect
of the City's actions were upheld, and were duplicated state-wide, no Oxford Houses
could exist in New Jersey." Id. at 1344. See also Federation of Orgs. for the Mentally
Disabled, Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay, CV 93-2070, slip op. at 15-16 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1994) (denial of building permit for housing for persons with mental disabilities had
disparate impact on persons with disabilities in violation of the FHAA); Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, No. 91-2402-C(7), slip op. at 43-51 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28,
1994) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (attempted
enforcemennt of zoning ordinance had disparate impact on housing for recoverinng
alcoholics and substance abusers).
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In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Elliott v. City of Athens,'136
failed to properly consider the disparate impact of a facially-neu-
tral ordinance on a residence for handicapped persons. 137 In Elli-
ott, a municipality successfully enjoined the establishment of a
residence for twelve unrelated recovering alcoholics and addicts. 38
The persons seeking to inhabit the residence demonstrated that
they needed to live in a group-home setting during their recovery
period 39 and that they could not operate an economically feasible
group home under the ordinance's prohibition, which limited
group homes to eight unrelated persons.140 Furthermore, the mu-
nicipality's planning department had determined that the residence
would not place a burden on the provision of municipal services.' 4'
Nonetheless, the Elliott court rejected the proposed residents' dis-
parate impact argument, stating that "[tihere was no attempt to
establish that the ordinance had a harsher effect on handicapped
persons wanting to live in group homes than on college students or
other non-handicapped persons desiring to live in group homes.
142
The Elliott court's interpretation of the disparate impact test was
erroneous. The proper test was not whether the ordinance had a
harsher effect on persons with handicaps desiring to live in group
homes than other persons wanting to live in group homes but
rather whether the ordinance had a harsher effect on persons with
disabilities desiring to live in the neighborhood than all other per-
136. 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992).
137. Id. at 981-84. The residence in question was for men who had finished a drug
rehabilitation program at a farm facility but were not yet ready to live on their own.
Id. at 977.
138. Id. at 977, 984. The ordinance governing the residence at issue permitted only
eight unrelated persons to live together. Id. at 976. Such ordinances may be violative
of the due process clauses of several state constitutions. See McMinn v. Town of Oys-
ter Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (N.Y. 1985); Charter Township v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831
(Mich. 1984); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); State v.
Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979). These courts held that ordinances limiting the
number of unrelated persons who could reside in a single family dwelling were uncon-
stitutional under the State due process clauses where there was no similar limitation
on related persons. The language of the FHAA does not specifically sanction maxi-
mum occupancy ordinances, but merely states that they are exempt from coverage
under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Supp. 1993). The Fair Housing Act does not
grant legality to ordinances that are illegal under the State due process clause, and,
therefore, there is no federal-state comity issue involved.
139. Elliott, 960 F.2d at 977. The director of the group home apparently indicated
that the intended residents "were not yet ready to live on their own." Id.
140. Id. at 981.
141. Id. at 977, 988.
142. Id. at 981.
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sons.14 3 The plaintiffs in Elliott proffered evidence demonstrating
that the ordinance had a harsher effect on persons with handicaps
desiring to reside in the neighborhood than non-handicapped per-
sons.'" The fact that the ordinance treated persons with handicaps
the same as college students or other non-handicapped persons was
irrelevant because neither college students nor other non-handi-
capped persons are covered under the FHAA.145
The Elliott court also wrongfully failed to balance the interests of
the recovering alcoholics and substance abusers with the interests
of the municipality. The municipality's own planning department
found that the proposed group home would not burden the provi-
sion of municipal services such as transportation, water, and sew-
age.146 Yet, the Elliott court found that the municipality had a
substantial interest in enforcing the facially-neutral ordinance to
control the density, traffic, and noise caused by unrelated college
students renting houses.147 Because non-handicapped college stu-
dents are not covered under the FHAA, their effect on a residen-
tial area should have been irrelevant to the Elliott court's
consideration of the group home. The Elliott court should only
have considered whether the proposed home would have a nega-
tive impact on the residential character of the area. Moreover, the
Elliott court's rationalization that the residence could have been
legally located in another district in the city also conflicts with the
intent of the FHAA to permit housing for persons with disabilities
in all areas. 48
143. See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934; Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. at
1183-84; Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 461.
144. Elliott, 960 F.2d at 977, 983. The proponent of the residence established that
(1) persons recovering from alcoholism or substance abuse needed a group home set-
ting more than other persons, (2) only larger group homes were economically feasi-
ble, and (3) if the municipal ordinance were enforced it would preclude the proposed
residents from living in the residence of their choice because it would permit only
eight residents to live together rather than the twelve necessary to make the residence
economically feasible. Id. at 977, 981, 983.
145. See Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285,
1296-97 n.9 (D. Md. 1993) (fact that requirement "'may also incidentally catch in its
net some group homes that serve individuals without handicaps does not vitiate the
facial invalidity of the rule which clearly restricts the housing choices of people based
upon their handicaps"' (citation omitted)).
146. Elliott, 960 F.2d at 977, 988.
147. Id. at 982.
148. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1344 (rejecting municipal-
ity's defense that residence could be located in another zoning district of municipality
and holding that Fair Housing Act was aimed at opening access for persons with disa-
bilities to all areas of the municipality); Harden v. Peach Bottom Township, No. 1:CV-
322
FHAA & PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
By presuming that the proposed residence would negatively af-
fect the community without considering the individual merits of the
home, the Elliott court engaged in impermissible stereotyping of
persons with disabilities in contravention of the FHAA. The Elli-
ott court ignored the intent of the drafters of the Amendments to
prohibit rules and regulations based upon "unfounded fears of dif-
ficulties about the problems that their [the handicapped] tenancies
may pose."'1 4 9
2. Special Use Permits
Some municipalities have ordinances requiring that groups of
unrelated persons obtain special-use permits.150 Although these
ordinances do not specifically refer to persons with handicaps, they
contain broad language that could be used to require permits for
group homes for persons with disabilities.' 5 ' As stated in the
House Report, the drafters of the FHAA unequivocally intended
to prohibit the imposition of special-use-permit requirements for
housing for handicapped persons. 52
The court in Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan
and Zoning Commission,'153 enjoined a municipality from demand-
ing a special-use permit for the establishment of a residence for
persons who were HIV-positive. 54 The ordinance at issue re-
quired permits for all charitable institutions and nursing homes.155
The McKinney Foundation court found that the requirement had a
discriminatory impact "because it ... [held] the future tenants up
to public scrutiny in a way that seven unrelated non-HIV-infected
persons would not be."'1 56 In addition, the court noted that the pro-
cedure for obtaining a special-use permit (1) had the potential of
being burdensome, 5 7 (2) could be "quite controversial and un-
92-1750, slip op. at 12 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1993) (no defense that residence could be
located in another area of municipality).
149. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
150. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450
(D.N.J. 1992); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n,
790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992).
151. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450
(D.N.J. 1992); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n,
790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992).
152. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
153. 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992).
154. Id. at 1222.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1219.
157. Id. at 1220.
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pleasant and further inflame public opposition, 158 and (3) could be
expensive for the organization seeking to establish the residence if
the neighbors were to appeal a decision to grant the permit. 159
In contrast, the court in Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach 60 found that a municipal ordinance requiring a special-use
permit for a residence for recovering alcoholics and substance
abusers did not violate the FHAA.161 While the court conceded
that the Amendments protected persons with handicaps from dis-
crimination, the court held that the FHAA did not prohibit zoning
authorities from making inquiries into housing for persons with
handicaps. 162
The City of Virginia Beach decision is disingenuous and in con-
flict with the drafters' intentions of the FHAA. The court's hold-
ing allows municipalities to discourage persons with disabilities
from residing in residential communities by applying permit re-
quirements. Because of their handicaps, many persons cannot live
in residential communities unless they reside in larger group
homes. By their very nature, permit applications cause delays in
access to housing. 63 Accordingly, homeowners may decline to sell
or rent their houses to persons with handicaps if the sale or rental
must await the outcome of the permit process. In addition, permit
applications often subject the applicant to public scrutiny."6 Con-
sequently, persons with handicaps will undoubtedly avoid commu-
nities that require permits in favor of those communities that do
not. The FHAA was aimed at removing barriers "that have the
effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the resi-
dence of their choice in the community.' 1 65 No matter how well-
meaning or innocuous, permit requirements have the effect of lim-
iting the ability of persons with handicaps to reside in the residence
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993).
161. Id. at 1261-64.
162. Id. at 1261-62; see also Ardmore, Inc. v, City of Akron, No. 90-CV-1083, slip
op. at 17 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 1992) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal) (finding that municipality could require community residence for
persons with mental retardation to obtain a permit because ordinance also required
similarly sized groups of non-related persons to obtain permits).
163. See Horizon House Dev. Servs. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.
Supp. 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (variance procedure
is "lengthy, costly and burdensome"); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc., 790 F. Supp.
at 1220 (variance procedure "has the potential of being burdensome . . . [and]
expensive").
164. Id.
165. House Report, supra note 1, at 2179, 2185.
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of their choice and therefore do not comport with the intentions of
the drafters of the FHAA.
B. Statutes and Rules Treating Persons With Handicaps
Differently From Non-Handicapped Persons
States and municipalities frequently place requirements on hous-
ing for persons with disabilities that are not placed on housing for
non-handicapped persons. 166 As the drafters of the FHAA noted,
some laws are based upon "false or over-protective assumptions
about the needs of handicapped people, as well as unfounded fears
of difficulties about the problems that their tenancies may pose."1 67
Laws based on such assumptions or premises are violative of the
FHAA.
1. Safety Requirements
The clearest discussion of these statutes and rules is the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow,"6 In Mar-
brunak, a municipality attempted to place safety requirements on a
single-family residence for persons with mental retardation. These
standards were different from those applicable to other single-fam-
ily residences. 169 For example, normally the municipality only re-
quired a single family residence to have smoke alarms. 70 In this
case, however, the municipality had required the residence to pro-
vide additional fire safety equipment, including (a) a sprinkler sys-
tem with alarms, (b) fire retardant wall and floor coverings, (c)
lighted exit signs above all doorways, (d) push bars on all doors,
and (e) a fire extinguisher every thirty feet.17
The residence challenged the municipality's stricter safety stan-
dards, and the district court enjoined the enforcement of the ordi-
166. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp.
1285 (D. Md. 1993) (neighbor notification requirement); Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of
Stow, 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992) (extensive safety protections); Horizon House Dev.
Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(1,000 feet spacing requirement), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Familystyle of St.
Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991) (limitation on placement);
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 797 F. Supp. 918 (D. Utah 1991) (24 hour supervision);
Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (requirement of
proof of ability to live independently).
167. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
168. 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992).
169. Id. at 45.
170. Id. at 45 n.1.
171. Id.
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nance against the residence. 72 The Sixth Circuit affirmed. 73 The
circuit court noted that a municipality could impose higher safety
standards on residences for persons with handicaps, but must
demonstrate that the additional protection is warranted by the
unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped per-
sons.17" The court refused to enforce the municipality's stricter
safety standards because the ordinance made no attempt at individ-
ualizing its requirements to the needs or abilities of the persons it
purportedly sought to protect.175
Some municipalities may argue that stricter safety standards can
only benefit persons with handicaps. However, if a community's
standards are unnecessarily burdensome, they could discourage
providers of housing for persons with disabilities from locating
within that community. The effect would be fewer housing choices
for persons with handicaps. This would be in conflict with the in-
tention of the drafters of the FHAA to increase access to housing.
Additionally, institutional safety requirements on persons with dis-
abilities may stigmatize them and discourage them from overcom-
ing their handicaps.
Although in contravention of the FHAA, some courts have up-
held overprotective statutes that tend to stereotype persons with
172. Id. at 47-48.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 47.
175. Id. at 47-48. The court also found that the municipality's variance provisions
did not sufficiently individualize the ordinance's safety requirements so as to save the
ordinance from violating the FHAA. Likewise, in Potomac Group Home Corp. v.
Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993), a court considered the validity
of a local ordinance that excluded housing for persons who could not exit a home on
their own. The ordinance did not consider the actual safety and health needs of indi-
viduals. In striking down the ordinance, the court found that it served no legitimate
municipal purpose. Id. at 1299-1300. Even the municipality conceded that the ordi-
nance did not serve the fire and safety purposes for which it was originally enacted,
and the municipality failed to demonstrate how mobility and ability to independently
exit a residence should per se exclude a person with a handicap from residing in a
community residence. Id.
Similarly, the court in Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1008
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) struck down the municipal housing authority's policy to question
only persons with handicaps about their medical histories and ability to live indepen-
dently. The court ruled that the housing authority could have used less intrusive
means, such as a request for landlord references, to determine whether a prospective
tenant would pose a danger to other tenants. Id. The court noted that non-handi-
capped persons could similarly pose a risk to other tenants. Id. at 1008. Thus, the
Cason court found that without objective evidence to demonstrate a need to treat
persons with disabilities differently from non-handicapped persons, the housing au-
thority could not ask persons with disabilities to provide more information than other
persons regarding their medical histories and backgrounds. Id.
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handicaps. In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.,176 an occupant of a
community residence for persons with mental disabilities chal-
lenged a local ordinance that required group homes to provide
twenty-four hour supervision.177 The court upheld the ordinance
as being rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest
and, thus, not violative of the residents' rights under the FHAA 78
The Bangerter court, however, did not examine whether all per-
sons with handicaps residing in group homes needed twenty-four
hour supervision or whether there were a less intrusive means for
permitting persons with mental disabilities to reside in the commu-
nity.17 9 Under the FHAA's aim to void overprotective require-
ments, it cannot be presumed that all persons with mental
disabilities need twenty-four hour supervision to reside in the
community.8 0
2. Minimum Distance Separation Zoning
Some state and municipal laws require that community resi-
dences for persons with mental disabilities cannot be placed less
than a specified distance from a similar residence. 181 Because these
176. 797 F. Supp. 918 (D. Utah 1992).
177. Id. at 920, 922.
178. Id. at 922-23.
179. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
180. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
181. See ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(H) (1986) (1,200 feet between resi-
dences); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(2)(b), 31-23-303(2)(b) (1977) (750 feet be-
tween residences); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3f (West Supp. 1987)(1,000 feet
between residences); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923(c) (Supp. 1986) (5,000 feet be-
tween residences); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-13-21-12 (West Supp. 1986) (3,000 feet be-
tween residences); IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.25(3) (West Supp. 1987) (1/4 mile
between residences); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:478(B) (West Supp. 1987) (1,000 feet
between residences); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A(4) (West Supp. 1987)
(1,500 feet between residences and no "excessive concentration" of residences);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.216(a)(4), 125.583b (4) (West 1986) (1,500 feet be-
tween residences but 3,000 feet in cities with population over one million and no ex-
cessive concentration); NEB. REV. STAT § 18-1746 (1983) (1,200 feet between
residences); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West Supp. 1986) (1,500 feet between
residences); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-22 (1982) (1/2 mile between residences); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 1011n, § 3(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (1/2 mile between resi-
dences); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5(2)(f) (supp. 1987) (3/4 mile between resi-
dences); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409(d) (Supp. 1987) (1,000 feet between
residences); W. VA. CODE § 27-17-2(a) (1986)(1,200 feet between residences outside
of municipality); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15)(a) (1988) (2,500 feet between resi-
dences). In New York, an over concentration of similar residences resulting in a sub-
stantial alteration of an area is prohibited. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5)
(McKinney 1988). In Missouri, municipalities may set "reasonable" density stan-
dards. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Municipalities have also set
distance limitations. See Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91,
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statutes do not place distance limitations on residences for non-
handicapped persons, they have been challenged as being violative
of the FHAA. These challenges have met with conflicting
results. 182
Some authorities theorize that distance limitations between resi-
dences prevent the segregation of persons with mental handicaps
from the mainstream. 183 These authorities believe that the distance
limitations are necessary to integrate persons with disabilities into
the mainstream of society and that segregation into certain, usually
less affluent, neighborhoods would result but for the distance re-
quirements. 8' Such segregation, it is proffered, could be harmful
to the well-being of persons with disabilities.185
Other authorities postulate that because non-handicapped per-
sons can live in neighborhoods with persons of their racial, reli-
gious, or ethnic group without governmental limitations, persons
with disabilities should not be restricted from residing in the neigh-
borhood of their choice, even if the neighborhood already contains
a large number of other persons with handicaps. 86 These authori-
ties theorize that there is no reason to believe that massing persons
with handicaps into a neighborhood would be harmful. 87
In Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul,88 the operator
of a residence for persons with mental illness challenged a state
statute and a local zoning ordinance that placed a spacing require-
ment of 1,320 feet between community residences. 189 Both the dis-
trict court and the Eighth Circuit upheld the statute and ordinance,
holding that the laws furthered the goal of integrating persons with
93 (8th Cir. 1991) (City of St. Paul has distance limitation of 1,320 feet between resi-
dences); Horizon House Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.
Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aftd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (Township of Upper
Southampton has distance limitation of 1,000 feet between residences).
182. Compare Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.
1991) with Horizon House Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993). It should be noted the
state attorney generals of Delaware, Kansas, Maryland and North Carolina have
opined that distance rules in their states are unlawful. Horizon House Dev. Servs.,
804 F. Supp. at 694 n.4.
183. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396, 1402-04 (D.
Minn. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 91, 94-95 (8th Cir. 1991).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Horizon House Dev. Servs., 804 F. Supp. at 699.
187. Id. at 698.
188. 728 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1990), affd 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 1398.
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handicaps into the community. 19° The district court particularly
noted that the law "prevents the clustering of homes which could
lead the mentally ill to cloister themselves and not interact with the
community mainstream. 19
1
The Familystyle decision is not consistent with the intention of
the drafters of the FHAA. The court heard no evidence that
would have demonstrated that persons with mental illness would
not interact with the mainstream if they resided in houses fewer
than 1,320 feet apart. Moreover, the court did not examine
whether there were less intrusive limitations that could have
achieved the same result. 92 A primary purpose of the FHAA was
to give persons with mental illness access to housing so that they
could reside in a community of their choice. 93 Because persons
who are not handicapped are permitted to "cloister themselves and
not interact with the community mainstream," persons who are
handicapped should have the same right.
In contrast, the court in Horizon House Development Services,
Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton'94 invalidated an ordi-
nance that placed a 1,000-foot distance limitation between group
homes.195 The court specifically found that there was no evidence
establishing that persons with handicaps living close to one another
is per se detrimental. 96 Based on this finding, the court held that
the law violated the FHAA because there was no similar limit on
the choice of residences placed upon biological families or other
groups of non-handicapped persons.197
Unlike the Familystyle decisions, Horizon House demonstrates
an understanding of the goals of the FHAA. The Horizon House
decision not only provides persons with handicaps with access to
housing, it does so without assuming that persons with handicaps
can only live in certain areas for their own well-being. The
190. See 728 F. Supp. at 1404; 923 F.2d at 94-95.
191. 728 F. Supp. at 1404.
192. See id. at 1405 (questioning itself whether less drastic alternatives could have
sufficed or whether it was correct in placing limits on where persons with handicaps
could reside).
193. House Report, supra note 1, at 2185.
194. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
195. Id. at 685.
196. Id. at 698.
197. Id. at 699; see also, Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, No. 91-2402-C(7), slip
op. at 43 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 1994) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal) (holding that "the complaint of 'no more in my back yard' is just
as unacceptable excuse for discrimination against the handicapped as the discrimina-
tory cry of 'not in my backyard.' ").
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Familystyle decisions represent an overprotective view of persons
with handicaps and ignore the FHAA's twin aims of treating per-
sons with disabilities as individuals and of providing such persons
with access to housing in the community of their choice.
3. Notice and Public-Hearing Requirements
In Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County,198 a lo-
cal ordinance required a group home provider to give notice to
neighbors before operation and to submit itself to a public hearing
where community opposition was prevalent. 199 The court found
that the ordinance served no legitimate municipal purpose and vio-
lated the FHAA. 200 Like the court in Horizon House, the court in
Potomac Group Home held that "integration" was not an adequate
justification for an ordinance under the FHAA.2 °' Moreover, the
court found the "neighbor notification rule" offensive because it
assumed that people with disabilities are different from other per-
sons and need to take special steps "to become part of the commu-
nity. ' 2°2 The court equated the "neighbor notification rule" with a
hypothetical requirement that minority persons give notice before
moving into a non-minority neighborhood and found that such no-
tices "galvanize neighbors in their opposition to the homes. '"203
In addition, the court found that the public hearing requirement
violated the FHAA2° because it singled out persons with disabili-
ties for public scrutiny20 5 and because the hearings were dominated
by community concerns and community prejudices.206 The court
found that the municipality could obtain the same information
198. 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993).
199. Id. at 1296-99 (requirement of neighbor notification prior to establishment of
group homes and, in certain instances, public hearings). New York has a similar stat-
ute. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (requiring noti-
fication and hearings prior to establishment of residences for persons with mental
disabilities). For more on the New York statute see Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not in My
Neighborhood": Legal Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for
the Mentally Disabled in New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985).
200. Potomac Group Home Corp., 823 F. Supp. at 1296-99.
201. Id. at 1296-97.
202. Id. The court cited a report from the American Planning Association conclud-
ing that a "low-profile sitting [sic] approach best facilitates integration into the com-
munity." Id. at 1296 n.10.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1297-99.
205. Id.
206. Id. The court noted that although the municipality may not itself harbor
prejudices, its design of procedures that facilitated the expression of prejudices and
gave weight to such views in the process violated the Amendments. Id.
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from community residence providers through less onerous non-
public meetings where experts could consult and consider the pro-
vider's programs."
Both the Horizon House and Potomac Group Home decisions
correctly understand that the key aim of the FHAA is to provide
access to housing for persons with disabilities and that any obsta-
cles placed by municipalities in the path of access violate the inten-
tions of the drafters of the FHAA.
IV. Reasonable Accommodation and the Maximum Occupancy
Exemption
One of the strongest weapons that persons with handicaps can
utilize to combat housing discrimination under the FHAA is the
statutory requirement that municipalities make a reasonable ac-
commodation in their rules and practices to permit persons with
disabilities to reside in a residence of their choice. Some courts
have applied the reasonable accommodation standard to enjoin
discriminatory practices without considering whether there was any
discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact.20 8 The FHAA's
reasonable accommodation section generally has been interpreted
liberally in favor of access to housing.20 9
207. Id. The court especially noted that the hearings were useless because the
neighbors had no expertise with regard to group homes. Id.
208. See, e.g., Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (dissent
considered only reasonable accommodation issue); Parish of Jefferson v. Allied
Health Care, Inc., Nos. 91-1199, 91-1200, 91-3959 (E.D. La. June 10, 1992) (unpub-
lished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (considering only rea-
sonable accommodation issue); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872,
878 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (considering only reasonable accommodation issue).
209. See, e.g., Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, No. 91-2402-C(7), slip op. at 52-
56 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 1994) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Ubran
Law Journal); U.S. v. City of Philadephia, 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993); North
Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. I11.
1993); Horizon House Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v.
Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992); United States v. City of Taylor,
798 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Mich. 1992), rev'd sub. nom., Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City
of Taylor - F.3d - (6th Cir. 1993); Parish of Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, Inc.,
Nos. 91-1199 (E.D. La. June 10, 1992) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal); United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp.
220 (D.P.R. 1991); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis.
1991); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991)
(all courts required municipalities to make reasonable accommodations in their laws
and ordinances to permit housing for persons with handicaps).
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A. The Breadth of the "Reasonable Accommodation"
Requirement
In Parish of Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, Inc. ,21' a provider of
housing for persons with mental handicaps sought to convert two
attached two-family duplex dwellings into two single family dwell-
ings with an open internal passageway between them. 211 Under the
provider's plan, each single family dwelling would house six unre-
lated handicapped persons. 212 The municipality's zoning ordi-
nance, however, only permitted four unrelated persons to reside
together in a single family residence.21 3 Consequently, even
though the homes as two-family dwellings could legally house eight
unrelated persons at each residence,21 4 the municipality argued
that the provider's conversion plan violated the zoning ordinance
and, it sought to block the conversion.215
The court enjoined the municipality from thwarting the pro-
vider's conversion plan.21 6 In rejecting the municipality's argu-
ments concerning traffic congestion, drainage, and sewerage
increases,217 the court noted that if the residences remained as two-
family dwellings, they could house more people than they would
under the proposed plan.21 8 Consequently, the court held that the
municipality had to make a reasonable accommodation in its ordi-
nance to permit the provider to renovate the residences into one-
family dwellings.219
Similarly, in United States v. Village of Marshall,220 a provider of
housing for persons with mental disabilities sought to establish a
dwelling less than 2,500 feet from another similar residence. The
provider's plan contravened a state law prohibiting the establish-
210. Parish of Jefferson, Nos. 91-1199.
211. Id. at 2-3.
212. Id. at 3.
213. Id.
214. Parish of Jefferson, Nos. 91-1199 slip op. at 13. The Parish of Jefferson court
cited as precedent cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because courts
have interpreted that statute to require that municipalities receiving Federal funding
to make a reasonable accommodation in rules and practices to permit access to per-
sons with handicaps. Id. at 10-12. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979); Majors v. Housing Auth., 652 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981)
(interpreting what is a "reasonable accommodation" for the purpose of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973).
215. Parish of Jefferson, Nos. 91-1199 slip op. at 5.
216. Id. at 16.
217. Id. at 13.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 13-14.
220. 787 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
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ment of such residences less than 2,500 feet apart.221 The court
prohibited the municipality from enforcing the state law.2 2 2 The
court reasoned that because a river separated the two residences,
the establishment of the proposed residence would not have any
significant adverse impact on the state's goal of preventing the
overconcentration of such residences in one area.22 Furthermore,
the siting of the residence would-not impose any undue hardship or
burden upon the municipality.224 Thus, the court ordered the mu-
nicipality to make a reasonable accommodation to permit the es-
tablishment of the residence. 225
B. Attempts to Limit "Reasonable Accommodation"
Municipalities have proffered several arguments to limit the in-
terpretation of "reasonable accommodation" for the purposes of
the FHAA. First, they have argued that establishing a separate
zone for housing for handicapped persons is a reasonable accom-
modation.2 6 They have also asserted, with limited success, that al-
lowing persons to seek a variance from a municipal ordinance is a
221. Id. at 873.
222. Id. at 879.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. In both the Parish of Jefferson and Village of Marshall cases, the courts
found in favor of the houses in issue on the ground that a reasonable accommodation
was necessary to permit persons with disabilities to reside in residences of their
choice. However, in Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, No. 92-1903 (6th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1993) (unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal),
the court found that even though a reasonable accommodation was necessary to per-
mit a particular residence for persons with disabilities to be placed in a residential
neighborhood, that fact was not sufficient to permit the establishment of the resi-
dence. The Smith & Lee court held that if it were found that the reasonable accom-
modation was only necessary to permit the profit-making provider of housing to make
a profit, the court would not require the municipality to make a reasonable accommo-
dation, regardless of whether the provision of the accommodation would harm the
municipality.
As discussed previously and as stated by the dissent in Smith & Lee, the purpose of
the FHAA is to permit persons with disabilities access to housing of their choice.
Thus, under the FHAA, an accommodation would be required so long as it is reason-
able, regardless of the profit motives of.the housing provider. Because the Smith &
Lee decision could result in housing being denied to persons with handicaps without
demonstration of harm to the municipality, the Smith & Lee decision does not com-
port with the aims of the FHAA.
226. Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1344 (fact that residence can be
placed in other neighborhoods is irrelevant); accord Harden v. Peach Bottom Town-
ship, No. 1:CV-92-1750, slip op. at 12 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1993); cf Elliott, 960 F.2d at
982-83 (municipality can legitimately set aside certain neighborhoods for housing for
persons with handicaps).
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reasonable accommodation. 2 7 As discussed earlier, requiring spe-
cial variances and permits discourages access to housing and is not
sanctioned by the FHAA.
In Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield,2 28 the court spe-
cifically rejected a municipality's argument that it could exclude a
handicapped persons' home from a given area because it permitted
housing for handicapped persons in other regions of the city. The
court noted that "anti-discrimination laws are designed to prevent
just such discriminatory segregation." 29 In Horizon House Devel-
opment Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton,3 ° the
court rejected a municipality's claim that its variance procedure
was a "reasonable accommodation," noting that the procedure was
"lengthy, costly and burdensome."2 31 However, in Oxford House,
Inc. v. City of Albany,232 the court found that use of a municipal
variance procedure could constitute a "reasonable accommo-
dation. 233
C. FHAA's Exemption of Maximum Occupancy Regulations
The requirement to make a reasonable accommodation is not
nullified by the Amendments' exemption of local and state restric-
tions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to
occupy a dwelling. Otherwise, the exemption provisions would be
inconsistent with the stated intentions of the drafters of the
Amendments.
In Parish of Jefferson, the court held that the Amendments' oc-
cupancy exemption had to be read consistently with the Amend-
ments' "reasonable accommodation" clause.2 34 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the municipality had to make a reasonable accom-
modation in an occupancy-limiting ordinance to permit the estab-
227. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261-64 (E.D.
Va. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1166, 1178 (N.D.N.Y.
1993); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F.
Supp. 1197, 1221-22 (D. Conn. 1992); Easter Seal Soc'y v. Township of N. Bergen, 798
F. Supp. 228, 236 (D.N.J. 1992); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.
Supp. 450, 463 (D.N.J. 1991).
228. 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
229. Id. at 1344.
230. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
231. Id. at 700; accord Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 1221-22;
Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 463; Easter Seal Soc'y, 798 F. Supp. at 236; cf
City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. at 1178; City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1261-64.
232. 819 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
233. Id. at 1178.
234. Parish of Jefferson, No 91-1199, 91-1200, 91-3959 at 14-15.
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lishment of a residence.235 In effect, the court held that the
reasonable accommodation provisions took precedence over the
exemption section.
Similarly, in Elliott v. City of Athens,236 a dissenting opinion ar-
gued that a municipality should be required to make a reasonable
accommodation to permit a residence for recovering alcoholics and
substance abusers, despite an occupancy-limiting ordinance.237
Unfortunately, in permitting the municipality to prohibit the resi-
dence, the majority did not consider the reasonable accommoda-
tion provisions of the statute.238 Rather, the court held that the
Amendments' exemption clause precluded the applicability of the
FHAA.239
Even if the FHAA did not contain a reasonable accommodation
provision, the Elliott decision still conflicts with both the language
of the exemption and the drafters' intention with regard to the ex-
emption. The FHAA only permits "reasonable" local and state re-
strictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted
to occupy a dwelling.24° In Elliott, because the municipality's plan-
ning board found that the residence at issue would not burden mu-
nicipal services 241 and no evidence was presented that the
residence would substantially alter the residential character of the
neighborhood,242 the Elliott court erred in finding that the munici-
pality's restriction was reasonable.
Moreover, the drafters of the House Report stated that reason-
able, occupancy-level restrictions would be permitted "as long as
they were applied to all occupants and did not operate to discrimi-
235. Id.
236..960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
237. Id. at 987-88.
238. Id. at 984 n.12.
239. Id. The court rejected the argument of the proponents of the residence that
the exemption only applied to a limitation on the number of persons per square foot
in a residence and did not apply because there was not a "maximum occupancy limita-
tion" on the number of related persons residing together. Id. at 979-81. In Oxford
House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1258-59 (E.D. Va. 1993), the
court rejected the argument of the Elliott court, citing legislative history for the posi-
tion that the "maximum occupancy limitation" exemption could only be applicable if
it applied to all persons, related and unrelated. Accord Harden v. Peach Bottom
Township, No. 1:CV-92-1750, slip op. at 14-15 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1993); Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, No. 91-2402-C(7), slip op. at 35 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 1994)
(unpublished opinion on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal); see also House
Report, supra note 1, at 2192.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (Supp. 1993).
241. 960 F.2d at 977, 988.
242. Id.
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nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handi-
cap or familial status. ' 243 The court in Oxford House, Inc. v. City
of Virginia Beach,2" relied upon the congressional report in hold-
ing that a local ordinance permitting only four or fewer unrelated
persons to reside in a dwelling was not exempted from the Amend-
ments because it applied only to unrelated persons and not to all
persons.245
V. Abstention and the Anti-Injunction Act
Much of the litigation generated by the FHAA has involved the
interpretation of zoning ordinances. While Fair Housing Act issues
can be litigated in either state or federal courts, 246 many housing
advocates prefer to litigate in federal court. Housing advocates
theorize that federal courts may be more familiar than state courts
with the issues raised in discrimination cases247 and that municipali-
ties may be less accustomed with federal court procedure than with
state court procedure. Occasionally, municipalities have struck
first by initiating lawsuits in local courts. Housing advocates have
attempted to prevent those suits from proceeding by bringing fed-
eral actions. The municipalities have defended the federal actions
by raising the doctrine of abstention and the Federal Anti-Injunc-
tion Act.248 The decisions have varied as to whether federal courts
should abstain from FHAA issues where a previous proceeding
was filed in state court 249 and whether the Federal Anti-Injunction
243. House Report, supra note 1, at 2192.
244. 825 F. Supp. 125.1, 1258-59 (E.D. Va. 1993).
245. Id.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) (Supp. 1993).
247. For example, jurisdiction only lies in the Federal courts for claims of employ-
ment discrimination brought under Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1981). In Matthews v. Institute for Community Living, No.
CV92-4029, slip op. at 27 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1993) (unpublished opinion on file with
the Fordham Urban Law Journal), however, the district court, in abstaining from rul-
ing on an issue in a lawsuit to block housing for homeless persons with mental disabil-
ities, noted that "sometimes as a pragmatic matter, you're better off having these
issues decided by elected state judges."
248. See, e.g., Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 752 F. Supp. 1152
(D.P.R. 1990), rev'd, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Al-
bany, 819 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plain-
field, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
249. Compare Oxford House v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. at 1172 (Younger ab-
stention doctrine inapplicable); Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1333-38 (all
abstention doctrines inapplicable) with Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 262-64 (Younger ab-
stention doctrine applicable).
One court has held that when the federal government intervenes in a Fair Housing
Act case, the doctrine of abstention does not apply. In United States v. Village of
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Act should apply to enjoin state proceedings during the pendency
of a federal action.25 °
A. The Abstention Doctrine
Under the doctrine of abstention, which was set forth in the
Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris,5' federal courts
will abstain where there is an ongoing state proceeding, the pro-
ceeding implicates important state interests, and there is an oppor-
tunity in the state proceeding to raise the federal claims.25 2 Federal
courts should not apply the Younger abstention doctrine, however,
where state officials exhibit bad faith or harassment. 53 Further,
the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply where it is demon-
strated that immediate and irreparable harm will result absent fed-
eral court intervention.254
Two federal courts have declined to apply the Younger doctrine
and have retained jurisdiction over FHAA claims in spite of ongo-
ing state proceedings.2 55 In Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of
Plainfield, the court found that the local officials' earlier state court
proceeding to evict a residence for recovering alcoholics and sub-
stance abusers was brought to harass the residents 256 and that the
continuation of the state court proceeding would result in irrepara-
ble harm to the residents. 257 Similarly, in Oxford House, Inc. v.
City of Albany,258 the court found that the continuation of a state
Palatine, No. 93-C-2154, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. I11. May 12, 1993) (unpublished opinion
on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal), the court held that the doctrine of
abstention would not be applied to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the federal govern-
ment that followed on-going state proceedings commenced by a municipality. The
court reasoned that because the interests of the federal government-the vindication
of the public interest of providing for fair housing throughout the United States-
were different from that of the handicapped persons involved in the lawsuit and be-
cause the remedies the federal government sought were not available in the state
court proceeding, the abstention doctrine did not apply.
250. Compare City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. at 1171 (Anti-Injunction Act does not
apply); Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1341 (same) with Casa Marie 988
F.2d at 260-62 (Anti-Injunction Act does apply).
251. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
252. Id. at 43-44.
253. Id. at 53.
254. Id. at 46.
255. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. at 1172; Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at
1333-38.
256. Oxford House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1338-40.
257. Id. at 1333-39. The court also refused to apply any other. doctrine of absten-
tion. Id. at 1331-41.
258. 819 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
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court proceeding would result in irreparable harm to the
residents. z59
The First Circuit, in Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto
Rico,260 reached the opposite result in applying the Younger ab-
stention doctrine. There, an operator of a nursing home for per-
sons with disabilities commenced an action in federal court during
ongoing state court proceedings. 261 The Casa Marie court declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the FHAA case, finding that the nurs-
ing home operator had failed to demonstrate that a "great and im-
mediate harm" would occur if the state court proceedings
continued without federal intervention. 262 The nursing home oper-
ator could have presented its FHAA claims in state court. How-
ever, the record indicates that the state court proceedings were
commenced in response to neighborhood complaints and were
based upon prejudices and fears about handicapped elderly peo-
ple.263 Accordingly, the federal court should have exercised juris-
diction on the grounds that the local officials brought the state
court suit to harass the nursing home operator.
B. Federal Anti-Injunction Act
The Federal Anti-Injunction Act provides that "a court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments. ' '264 In both Oxford House-Evergreen and City of Al-
bany, the courts held that the Federal Anti-Injunction Act did not
apply, on the ground that Congress had intended to enact a broad
remedy to housing discrimination and that the "expressly author-
ized by Act of Congress" exception was satisfied by the FHAA.265
In contrast, the Casa Marie court held more persuasively that be-
259. Id. at 1172.
260. 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
261. Id. at 266-70.
262. Id. at 263. The court was particularly disgusted with the nursing home opera-
tor because of its delay in instituting its federal court action. Id. at 263-64.
263. Casa Marie, 752 F. Supp. at 1168-69. The district court found that state court
proceedings were commenced based upon prejudices and fears about handicapped
elderly persons. The official actions were taken in response to neighbors who com-
plained that the residence "might lower property values," that it would cause people
to "think about death" at the sight of hearses and ambulances, and that it would
"hinder the spontaneity of neighborhood children."
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978).
265. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1341 (D.N.J.
1991); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
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cause (a) the Fair Housing Act permitted aggrieved parties to bring
proceedings in either federal or state court and (b) there was no
legislative history demonstrating a distrust of state courts, the "ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress" exception did not apply. 66
If it were impossible for the Casa Marie nursing home operator to
litigate the Fair Housing Act issues in state court, the operator
could have raised the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" excep-
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act.267
VI. Recommendations and Conclusion
The FHAA provides a powerful vehicle for combating housing
discrimination against persons with handicaps. However, its effec-
tiveness can only be judged by the manner in which courts apply it.
The following are proposed recommendations for advocates and
courts for the most effective use of the FHAA in accordance with
the intentions of the statutes' drafters.
The FHAA mandates that persons with handicaps be treated as
individuals. Thus, persons with disabilities should not be eligible
for coverage under the FHAA simply because they fall within a
particular category of affliction. Rather, advocates should present
and courts should demand expert testimony demonstrating that
persons within a certain category are substantially limited by their
condition in one or more major life activities. In addition, a court
should require testimony by the resident or prospective resident to
demonstrate the substantial limitation of activities. Finally, testi-
mony must also be provided that connects the limitation in life ac-
tivity with a need for special housing arrangements.
Perhaps the strongest section of the FHAA is that which re-
quires municipalities to make a reasonable accommodation to per-
mit persons with handicaps to live in a residence of their choice.
Therefore, the consideration of whether a municipality has made a
reasonable accommodation should be at the center of every lawsuit
filed under the Amendments and every decision rendered by the
courts. This provision should overcome local maximum occupancy
restrictions and all but the most reasonable ordinances.
266. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir.
1993).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) (Supp. 1993). In cases involving great and immediate
irreparable harm, federal courts need not refrain from exercising jurisdiction even
where 28 U.S.C. section 2283 is applicable. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 112 (1982).
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In a disparate impact case involving a facially-neutral zoning
statute, an advocate should present evidence demonstrating that a
person with a handicap should not have to meet the exact letter of
the ordinance. Because the intentions of the Amendments in-
cluded an increased access to housing for persons with handicaps,
courts should be liberal in their consideration of whether a person
cannot conform with the statute because of a disability. Therapeu-
tic needs and financial inability caused by a person's disability
should be considered as bona fide reasons for inability to comply
with a zoning ordinance. Moreover, special-use permit require-
ments that subject persons with handicaps to public scrutiny and
that create burdensome procedures should strongly be considered
violative of the FHAA. That a municipality's ordinances may be
applicable to some non-handicapped groups is absolutely irrelevant
in any "disparate impact" case.
In disparate impact cases involving statutes that specifically ap-
ply to dwellings for persons with handicaps, the FHAA mandates
that such housing be treated the same as other residential dwell-
ings. However, an exception applies if a municipality can demon-
strate that a requirement is absolutely necessary for the safe
operation of the residence. If a municipality does have special re-
quirements, they must be tailored to meet the needs of the specific
house; general requirements applied to all persons with handicaps
contravene the FHAA. Because distance limitations and notice re-
quirements are not applied to housing for non-handicapped per-
sons, imposing these limitations on residences for persons with
disabilities clearly violates the FHAA. Accordingly, all distance
limitation statutes and statutes requiring notification of communi-
ties should be stricken.
In discriminatory intent cases, advocates and courts should look
closely at the timing between neighborhood opposition to a resi-
dence and action by a municipality. The closer in time a municipal-
ity's action is to a public meeting at which neighbors oppose a site,
the more likely it is that a court will find that a municipality's ac-
tion is tinged with discriminatory intent. Advocates should collect
all newspaper articles and hearing transcripts on disputes over resi-
dences, and should conduct discovery to determine how a munici-
pality has handled similar circumstances in the past.
In light of the First Circuit's decision in Casa Marie, it may be
difficult to persuade a federal court to take jurisdiction of FHAA
claims where there are ongoing proceedings in state court. There-
fore, the race to the courthouse may be crucial in FHAA cases. An
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advocate who desires to litigate an FHAA claim in federal court
should file there as soon as it appears that a municipality may take
action against a proposed or existing residence for persons with
handicaps. However, if an advocate can demonstrate that the mu-
nicipality commenced its action in state court in bad faith or to
harass, the federal court should not abstain from asserting jurisdic-
tion. In any event, an aggrieved party may file a complaint with
HUD simultaneously with a federal complaint, and the Depart-
ment of Justice can seek immediate relief if necessary. Thus ag-
grieved parties should take advantage of both administrative and
judicial forums.268
Finally, the Federal Anti-Injunction Act may be used to ensure
that a federal court retains jurisdiction over an FHAA complaint.
An advocate should attempt to utilize the "aid of jurisdiction"
clause found within the Federal Anti-Injunction Act by demon-
strating that the state court cannot properly litigate the FHAA
issues.
The drafters of the FHAA clearly envisioned that it would bar
municipalities from depriving persons with disabilities of their right
to reside in dwellings of their choice. Accordingly, the Amend-
ments permit persons with disabilities to overcome almost all barri-
ers placed in their path by municipalities. The only immovable
obstacles are those ordinances necessary to prevent substantial
burdens on the community or to prevent fundamental changes in
the neighborhood. Most courts have properly applied the FHAA
in accordance with the drafters' intentions. If all courts were to
discard stereotypes, persons with disabilities will be able to use the
Amendments to remove municipal barriers to housing.
268. An advocate may also attempt to remove a case from state court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1973), which permits removal in certain civil rights cases. In
Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 724-25 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that a state court action filed for the purpose of preventing a homeowner
from moving into a neighborhood was itself a violation of the Fair Housing Act and
could be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1973).
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